



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




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MEXICO

AND THE

MONROE DOCTRINE.

By Joseph L. Lock

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
AND

THE MONROE DOCTRINE.



THE author of these pages, an American citizen sincerely devoted to the welfare, and jealous of the honor of his native country, has had no object in view in composing them other than to ascertain, as fully and as impartially as possible, the exact truth in regard—First, To the present position of Mexico; secondly, To the precise force of the Monroe Doctrine; and thirdly, To the resultant duty and interest of the United States, as the natural champion of the Monroe Doctrine, and as the Great Power most nearly to be affected by the welfare or the misfortunes of Mexico.

To all his fellow-citizens in positions of public trust and responsibility he respectfully offers the fruits of his investigation into these three cardinal points.



MEXICO AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

It is almost equally undesirable for a great nation such as the United States, either on the one hand, to trifle with a serious invasion of its interests and its honor ; or, on the other, to plunge into war upon insufficient provocation.

To treat the Imperial Government actually established in Mexico as an affront offered to our national dignity, and as a peril to our welfare, is such a course of policy as must necessarily lead to one of two issues.

I. We shall degrade ourselves and damage our national prestige by a silly and obstinate refusal to recognize existing facts, and by reënacting toward the party or faction of the republicans in Mexico the semi-tragical farce played by Spain toward the party or faction of the Bourbonists in Italy after the consolidation of the peninsula under the authority of VICTOR EM-MANUEL.

II. We shall bring ourselves violently into collision with MAXIMILIAN and with France.

In either event, the material interests of the American people must certainly suffer ; in the first case, both by the partial interruption and the non-development of our commercial relations with Mexico, as well as by the uncertainty which a "pouting" public policy always introduces into the financial calculations of men of business : in the second case, by the enormous burden which a war with the first military Power of Europe must impose upon the resources of the Republic at the critical period when capital and industry are seeking to resume their normal activity throughout the land.

By what necessity, therefore, are we compelled into accept-

ing one or the other of these alternatives? If by no such necessity at all, how terrible is the responsibility assumed by those who, whether honestly or dishonestly, whether for the sake of winning a partisan triumph, or of asserting what they erroneously regard as a great principle of our national life, keep insisting upon it that such a necessity does constrain us in this matter of the Mexican Question?

If MAXIMILIAN I. succeeds in establishing an Imperial Government in Mexico without our recognition, a persistence in the "drifting" policy hitherto pursued by us toward him will expose us to ridicule as well as to material loss.

If we undertake to expel MAXIMILIAN by force of arms, having no moral right to do so, and no material interest of a kind which it comports with our national character to entertain, we go into a great war, which is always a game of uncertain issue, upon insufficient grounds.

Let us consider then :

I. What the "Monroe Doctrine" really affirms and was meant to affirm.

II. What the nature of the French intervention in Mexico really is.

III. What the history of republicanism and imperialism in Mexico itself has been.

I.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

The "Monroe Doctrine" was laid down by President MONROE in his annual message to Congress of December second, 1823 :

"It was stated, at the commencement of the last session, that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal, to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been, so far, very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citi-

zens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere, we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new governments and Spain, we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security."

The next year, in his message of December seventh, 1824, President MONROE felt it to be his duty to repeat these declarations, though in a milder form and modified tone.

“With respect to the contest to which our neighbors are a party, it is evident that Spain, as a power, is scarcely felt in it. These new States had completely achieved their independence before it was acknowledged by the United States, and they have since maintained it with little foreign pressure. The disturbances which have appeared in certain portions of that vast territory have proceeded from internal causes, which had their origin in their former governments, and have not been thoroughly removed. It is manifest that these causes are daily losing their effect, and that these new States are settling down under governments, elective and representative in every branch, similar to our own. In this course we ardently wish them to persevere, under a firm conviction that it will promote their happiness. In this, their career, however, we have not interfered, believing that every people have a right to institute for themselves a government which, in their judgment, may suit them best. Our example is before them, of the good effect of which, being our neighbors, they are competent judges, and to their judgment we leave it, in the expectation that other powers will pursue the same policy. The deep interest which we take in their independence, which we have acknowledged, and in their enjoyment of all the rights incident thereto, especially in the very important one of instituting their own governments, has been declared, and is known to the world. Separated as we are from Europe by the great Atlantic Ocean, we can have no concern in the wars of the European governments, nor in the causes which produce them. The balance of power between, into whichever scale it may turn in its various vibrations, can not affect us. It is the interest of the United States to preserve the most friendly relations with every power, and on conditions fair, equal, and applicable to all. But, in regard to our neighbors, our situation is different. It is impossible for the European governments to interfere in their concerns, especially in those alluded to, which are vital, without affecting us; indeed, the motive which might induce such interference, in the present state of the war between the parties, if a war it may be called, would appear to be equally applicable to us.”

In these messages we have the text of the famous Monroe Doctrine.

What, now, was the force intended to be given to this doctrine by its author, the Chief Magistrate of the Union?

When President MONROE spoke of the attempt to extend to America the system of European institutions as "unfriendly to the United States," did he mean that this consisted in the efforts actually made at this time by Spain to recover an authority which she was losing over American populations recently constituted into republics; or in the possible establishment of a monarchy in the New World, even though that monarchy should be independent, and should be endowed with representative institutions? In other words, was the doctrine of President MONROE aggressive or defensive in character? Clearly defensive. To be sure of this, we need only consider the political circumstances under which it was uttered.

These are: 1. The conduct of Spain in regard to her former American colonies, from 1814 to 1819. 2. The formation of the Holy Alliance. 3. The position of the United States in the time of MONROE.

Upon the accession of JOSEPH BONAPARTE to the throne of Spain, her American colonies imitated the mother country. They rose in arms. As JOSEPH had neither ships nor harbors, and controlled only the interior provinces, the old relations were soon suspended between Spain and the New World. Merchants of Glasgow, Liverpool, and London availed themselves of this state of things to secure new markets for English commerce, then greatly straitened by the continental blockade. They flooded Spanish America with English goods. A little later, when the Cortes met at Cadiz, the British Government tried to legalize and confirm these new commercial relations. But the jealous, selfish policy which had always controlled the intercourse of Europe with the colonies was dear to the insurgent Cortes, which systematically rejected every proposition likely to affect the traditional Spanish monopoly of the New World. This greed was to cost Spain dear. Ere long, Caracas, Chili, Buenos Ayres, and Mexico, sustained and stimulated zealously by the Cabinet of London, had passed from a declared separation from the crown of King JOSEPH into a downright declaration of independence.

Such was the state of things when FERDINAND VII., after

the abdication of Fontainebleau, was restored to the throne of his ancestors. This prince found the social and political order which he represented in a very different condition from that in which he had left it six years before. The enormous resources once drawn by Spain from America no longer fed the treasury, and FERDINAND soon concentrated his policy upon the single object of recovering these resources.

As his only offensive weapons were a few worn-out men-of-war, insufficiently equipped, and a handful of demoralized troops, the only result of his first efforts was to excite fresh passions against his government. The liberated colonies retaliated upon him most audaciously, sending their privateers to capture Spanish ships in the ports of Spain herself. Finally, after five years of fruitless efforts, FERDINAND raked together all the disposable funds of the state, issued a forced loan of three millions of dollars, and, toward the end of 1819, got together sixteen or seventeen thousand soldiers around Cadiz for an American expedition. The result is well known. Germs of discontent, till then scattered through Spain, broke forth openly among the troops, and the Spanish Revolution began, to be crushed, not long afterward, by the Holy Alliance.

Allusions to these events are numerous in President MONROE's message of 1823. Seeing the Spanish Americans threatened by Spanish dreams of a restored sovereignty, the President sought to dissipate those dreams, and thus to aid the consolidation of the new republics. These republics had been recognized by the United States in 1822—just so soon (says Mr. MONROE) as there ceased to be any doubt as to the fact of their independence, and as to the folly of the hopes of restoration cherished by a beaten and desperate government.

Mr. MONROE does not oppose the general system of colonies and European dependencies actually existing in America, but simply the attempts of the mother country upon "governments which have declared and maintained their independence."

"In the war between these new governments and Spain," he says, "we have declared our neutrality. This we shall maintain until there shall be some change, necessitating on our part also a change indispensable to our security."

Now, what, according to MONROE, is this possible "change?"

It is the violent re incorporation, under Spanish authority, of the definitely established, recognized and constituted Southern republics. Hence, for the United States to have just cause of interference in the affairs of a neighboring people, this people must have thrown off the colonial yoke, proclaimed and maintained its independence, and be in existence as a regular government. These declarations fix the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, and determine the eventualities, which, in the eyes of the President, would make it possible and proper to apply it.

It will have been observed, that, whenever MONROE speaks of the European Powers, he alludes to them by the phrase, "the allied Powers." This phrase shows what thought, in truth, it was, which filled the mind of the President in regard to Europe. This was his anxiety about the "Holy Alliance," which had daily grown in its pretensions since 1814, and in 1823 had reached its apogee.

The "Alliance" had been formed, according to itself, first, to protect the *independence of peoples and of states*, and to beat down the *spirit of domination* and conquest in the person of NAPOLEON. In 1818, the contracting Powers had renewed their alliance in the secret treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle for the purpose of resisting *the spirit of revolution*. - In 1820, upon the first outbreaks in Naples, they had proclaimed immobility as the law of monarchical Europe.

An occasion was soon found to apply these principles. The rising in Naples and Piedmont gave Austria her long-sought pretext for action. She intervened in the north and in the south of Italy for the glory of monarchical right. But she did not propose to stop here. She desired a formal indorsement of intervention as a principle. The conferences of Laybach, opened January eighth, 1821, resulted in an open collective declaration of the three Northern Courts, that "the world, and good men in all lands, would always find in their union a sure guarantee against disturbers of the public peace."

Let us add, that neither France nor England threw any weight of liberal policy, so far as Europe was concerned, against this exaggerated revival of divine right. The British Cabinet, indeed, declared, that the organic laws of Great

Britain refused to sanction either the right of intervention or treaty which claimed for the allied courts an incontestable supremacy inconsistent with the independence and the rights of other States; but it fully admitted that other Powers, and in especial Austria and the Italian Courts, might be in a different position, and that consequently England had no mind to interfere with any measures which Austria and the Italian Courts might think best for their safety to adopt.

As to France, she first affirmed an absolute neutrality; but soon threw off all scruples, and herself intervened in Spain to strike down the constitutional government, under the pretense that it was an attack on the principle of legitimacy, and in obedience to the mission confided to her by the Northern Courts.

All this took place in 1823, a few months before MONROE'S message was sent in.

Now all these facts were brought under the President's eye by the British Minister CANNING, when he drew up this famous "doctrine." He saw all Europe in the power of the "Holy Alliance." He had reason to fear that it might, ere long, maintain the pretensions of certain sovereigns in the New World.

"How far," he asks, "is this principle of intervention to be applied? This is a question which interests all independent Powers and all governments which differ from those of Europe, even the most remote, and none certainly more than the United States." Again: "I informed you at the beginning of the last session, that a great effort was preparing in Spain and Portugal to ameliorate the condition of both countries, and that the attempt seemed to be marked by extreme moderation.* I need not observe to you *how greatly the result has differed from all expectations.*" (Message of December second, 1823.)

This will show us how much light the events then actually happening in Europe threw upon the message of 1823. The efforts of Spain against her emancipated colonies, the movements of the "Holy Alliance," intervening with the sword of

* The French royalist Minister VILLELE was opposed to interference in Spain, and in 1822, Louis XVIII. gave "satisfactory explanations" on this point.

France herself in behalf of the Spanish monarchy, at the very moment when the Spanish sovereign had identified himself with a succession of luckless attempts to re-subjugate the Spanish American republics; the suggestion made by a British Minister to the American government; these make up the determining facts which inspired the "Monroe Doctrine."

Still a third point, however, deserves our attention, for it doubtless stimulated the President in his course. We mean the situation of the United States in 1823.

The Union was far from having attained in 1823 its present degree of power. Not only did it then lack the moral force which public opinion everywhere gives to free institutions to-day, but it could hardly be regarded as absolutely beyond the reach of hostile attempts from the Western Courts. Scarcely nine years had elapsed since England had invaded American soil, and captured Washington. Toward the end of 1814, New-Orleans had been threatened, and it was only in January, 1815, that the utter defeat of PACKENHAM ended the war in a manner honorable to America. MONROE, as War Minister, had carried on this conflict, and with rare energy. He could not believe that he had made such melancholy effusion of blood forever impossible, and he might still apprehend that England would avail herself of any favorable opportunity for attacking the United States. "It is impossible," he said, "that the European governments should intervene in America on subjects which to the new States are matters of life and death, without affecting us. . . . the motives of their intervention may one day apply to us."

Such are the facts which determine the exact sense and bearing of the "Monroe Doctrine." Like most of our great statesmen, MONROE was a practical man, and had a clear and just perception of the condition of the Union. He saw, he felt the danger which he sought to avert; but there was nothing in his nature or his genius to make him the author of a speculative doctrine, utterly without immediate or practical applications. He wished to defend free and independent States against attempts which had become unjust; he regarded the fortunes of the Union as bound up with respect for their institutions; this was all that he said; this all that he saw.

To imagine that MONROE cherished any passionate prejudices against Europe, is to forget, in the first place, that he had lived himself in Europe for long years, in the discharge of important diplomatic duties at London and Paris ; and in the second place, that, in speaking of the "Holy Alliance" and its acts, he uses a moderation and temperance of speech quite incompatible with the extreme inflexible theories attributed to him.

The best commentary upon the Monroe Doctrine, however, is the foreign policy of the United States at the time of its publication. We find that the United States did not hesitate to recognize the Imperial Government of ITURBIDE, in Mexico or the Crown of Brazil ; and that they made no effort to stir up revolt in Cuba or in Canada.

In all this the policy of the Union conformed to the declarations of the message of 1823 : "As to the existing colonies and dependencies of European powers, we have not intervened, nor will we intervene in their affairs."

We have seen what the "Monroe Doctrine" affirms, and was meant to affirm. It is noteworthy in this connection that no American statesman, at the time of its promulgation, ever imagined it to possess the transcendent importance now sought to be assigned to it. BENTON, in his remarkable work, *A Thirty Years' View of the Working of the American Government, from 1820 to 1850*, passes over absolutely without notice this "Doctrine," which, as we are now gravely asked to believe, contains the very quintessential principles of our national dignity and safety !

II.

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO.

What took France into Mexico ? What government did she find there ? and what government by the help of her arms there establish ? These three questions should be sincerely and impartially examined into, that we may ascertain whether the Monroe Doctrine requires the United States to take hostile action against the French and the New-Mexican Empire.

By the official documents, we learn that the French expedi-

tion to Mexico was begun as a simple, legitimate act of defense. It is well known that for twenty-five years Mexican governments had been guilty not only of reported exactions and spoliations upon Europeans and their commerce, but of crimes against the life of foreign residents. England and Spain, also, had their grounds of complaint on these heads; but France had seen her consular agent and her citizens insulted, and their claims treated with contumely.

The French Government claims to have acted in this matter with all possible forbearance, and to have exhausted all other means of redress before appealing to arms. To the first importunities of his creditors JUAREZ replied that the pacification of the country had left the finances in disorder. All who had lent money to the Mexican Government thereupon informed their respective governments of this serious condition of things, and asked protection.

Nevertheless, as the disorder of the finances was real, France, England, and Spain allowed President JUAREZ to consolidate the debt on condition that it should hereafter bear interest at a rate fixed by the lenders. The first rate fixed was held to be excessive, and it was lowered. Things were at this point, and no further trouble was anticipated, the arbitrators having treated the debtors with the greatest consideration. The first payment of interest fell due. JUAREZ, as before, refused to pay it, under the old pretext of "no funds," although he had shortly before received large sums of money destined to pay this interest. It was plainly out of the question to admit of this new plea of "impossible." The head of a State, still more than a private individual, must fulfill his pecuniary obligations, especially when their amount, though important to the creditors, is comparatively insignificant for the debtor.

One of two things—either JUAREZ had no material means of honoring his signature, in which case he represented only an inadequate and even an imaginary government, or he did not mean to honor it; in which case it was proper to punish him. Upon this the European governments broke off all relations with him, and united to obtain redress.

Such, in a few words, was the origin of the Mexican expe-

dition. It had but one object, the recovery of sums due to France, and security for French citizens. This is shown by the Convention of October thirty-first, 1861, which stands in permanent contrast to all stories of cessions of territory made to France.

"The high contracting parties bind themselves not to seek, in the employment of the measures of coercion now to be undertaken, any acquisition of territory, or other special advantage." (Convention, Article 2.)

Of course the Convention of October thirty-first, 1861, has no longer any diplomatic force, but the engagement entered into by France and her then allies is at least morally binding still. That it is so regarded by France may be properly inferred from the fact that France made no acquisition of territory in Mexico after the withdrawal of her allies had left the whole expedition upon her shoulders, and the successes of the French army had made her mistress of the country. She might then have indemnified herself for her expenses. But as the French Government was then wise enough to decline adding to the troubles of a distant costly expedition by annexation of territory, it is hardly probable that it would now undertake such annexations when they would only increase the embarrassments of the new Mexican Government. The stories of an intended eventual cession of Sonora to France have been repeatedly and officially denied in France by the French Government, and more recently in this country, and in the columns of the New-York press, by the agent of MAXIMILIAN.

But to return to the European intervention. The objects of this intervention were so clearly defined by the Convention of October thirty-first, 1861, that the United States were invited to join the Western Powers in insisting upon analogous claims of American citizens.

It is true, that the United States refused to take part in the action of the European powers against Mexico. Beside the reasons given for the refusal, a sufficient motive to it existed in the then condition of the national struggle with the seceding States. Moreover, the "moral solidarity" which, by a principle very precious to this Government, unites the republics of the New World, imposed special duties of consideration

toward JUAREZ upon the United States Government, although it can not be contended that this "moral solidarity" goes to the extent of requiring us to uphold a republic which can neither uphold itself in the shape of order at home, nor of good faith abroad.

But it is no part of the policy of the United States to treat pecuniary questions as beneath the appeal to arms. On the contrary, the United States have treated such questions always as of great importance in international relations. We need cite but one example, which goes back to the Presidency of ANDREW JACKSON and the French monarchy of July.

The United States had long demanded indemnity for American ships seized and confiscated under the decrees of Berlin and Milan. NAPOLEON I. had never admitted the justice of the claim. The "Restoration" had met it with evasive replies. Finally, in 1830, Mr. RIVES, then United States Minister at Paris, seizing upon the opportunity afforded by the uncertainties of the new dynasty, got a treaty signed July fourth, 1831, which fixed the indemnity at twenty-five million francs, payable in installments. The French Government, when it signed this treaty, forgot only one thing, to reserve to itself the right of ratification by the legislature. President JACKSON, having nothing to do with this, drew the first bill.

The French Government asked the Chambers for the money to meet it. It was refused, and the draft went back protested. In his annual message (1834) President JACKSON denounced the conduct of France in strong terms, and went so far as to propose that the United States should take the law into their own hands, and if the draft was not honored by the French legislature at its next session, that Congress should pass a law for the seizure of French property.

"Since France," said the President, "in violation of the pledges given through her Minister here, has delayed her final action so long that her decision will not probably be known in time to be communicated to this Congress, I recommend that a law be passed authorizing reprisals upon French property, in case provision shall not be made for the payment of the debt at the approaching session of the French Chambers."

This passage of history shows us how resolutely the United

States can insist upon their pecuniary dues. And in more recent times the demand made upon England to indemnify American commerce for losses caused by the confederate cruisers built in England tends to the same point.

The precedents set by ourselves thus compel us to admit that the French expedition to Mexico was undertaken legitimately, in fulfillment of the duty of protection, which all civilized nations owe to their citizens against governments which imperil their interests or their safety.

III.

IMPERIALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN MEXICO.

THE Western Powers went to Mexico, as we have seen, on no crusade referring to the domestic affairs of that country, But the offenses against the law of nations, for which they demanded satisfaction from JUAREZ, brought out the fact that these offenses had their origin in the impotence, the malevolence, the incoherence of the authorities established under him in Mexico. When MONROE assured the new American republics in 1823 of the protection of the United States, he gave as his reason that "these new States were consolidated under elective and representative governments in all their branches," and that they were enjoying in peace all the benefits insured by such governments.

Was this true of Mexico in 1861?

The truth would appear to be that never had Mexico been given up so utterly and desperately to anarchy and civil confusion. Two governments *de facto* had for many months existed, the one installed with MIRAMON at Mexico, the other at Vera Cruz, with JUAREZ. France and England had offered their mediation to put an end to these deplorable dissensions, equally damaging to public law and to the rights of foreign residents. Having been accepted only by MIRAMON, the offer came to nothing, and JUAREZ, better served by his troops than his adversary, shortly after routed the latter, and fixed himself in the capital. This, however, did not pacify the country. As is often the case, the beaten MIRAMON was still strong enough to attack his victorious rival. JUAREZ was master of

Mexico in his turn, but the lieutenants of MIRAMON retiring into the provinces, as JUAREZ had formerly done, overthrew his authority in one State after another.

The troops of JUAREZ were even beaten in a combat near the City of Mexico itself. Violent measures taken by JUAREZ, increased this confusion.

The Envoys of Spain, the Holy See, and Guatemala were simultaneously expelled from the capital, on a charge of sympathy with MIRAMON. Needing money, the government of JUAREZ laid an arbitrary tax on fortunes, and incarcerated all who refused to pay it. In like manner the Church revenues were confiscated. Judicial officers assumed independent authority. An attempt being made to assassinate the French Envoy, the Mexican police gave him no protection.

In short, the government at Mexico was but the shadow and name of a government, while it had ceased to be even a shadow outside of the capital, and it bore no sort of resemblance to that orderly constitution of republican authority in which MONROE, in 1823, had taken so proper an interest.

In this state of affairs the Conservative party in Mexico availed itself of the presence of the French troops to constitute an imperial government, precisely as the Belgians, in 1831, availed themselves of a French intervention to complete their secession from Holland by establishing LEOPOLD upon a constitutional throne; or, as the people of the lesser Italian States, in 1859 and 1860, availed themselves of a French intervention to change their forms of government, and to incorporate themselves in a new and united Italy under VICTOR EMMANUEL.

No man in his senses denies that both in Belgium and in Italy liberty and order were thus secured; and if the future shall prove that liberty and order might also have been at once restored to unhappy Mexico, but for the encouragement given through our mistake or our malevolence by ourselves to the men who have incessantly abused the name of liberty in that country to the destruction of order, our responsibility in the premises will not be a pleasant thing for our children to remember. Neither the idea of constituting an empire in Mexico, nor the choice of MAXIMILIAN of Austria for the throne, were originated by the French. When Mexico achieved her independence of Spain, her people, unlike our own, had en-

joyed no experience in self-government; all their local traditions were monarchical, just as all our local traditions were democratic; and the first impulse of the truest Mexican patriots, with HIDALGO at their head, was to offer the independent throne of Mexico to a Spanish prince. Still earlier, indeed, it had been hoped, for a time, that FERDINAND, on the expulsion of his family by NAPOLEON I. from Spain, would accept an American monarchy from his American subjects; in which case it is possible that Mexico might have presented to-day to the world the same spectacle of order and prosperity which we see in Brazil, where, under the royal House of Braganza, ruling a constitutional empire, we find the American Portuguese richer, happier, and more considerable than the Portuguese of Europe.

Republican institutions, which proved to ourselves the guarantee of our prosperity, because they were rooted in our traditions and habits as colonial freemen, proved to Mexico the source of unnumbered evils, because they were entirely without such roots in that country. Efforts were constantly made to shake them off, the first successful one being that which raised ITURBIDE to the throne. After his downfall and death, the monarchical party in Mexico did not cease to exist; and its representatives sought everywhere for a prince whose origin might commend him to the traditions of the Mexican people, while his personal character should offer a prospect of success in the difficult task of reducing to order a country exhausted by forty years of anarchy, ambition, and misrule.

Descended from the great Spanish Emperor of Germany, CHARLES V., MAXIMILIAN of Austria, so long ago as 1853, attracted the attention of the Mexican Imperialists. Then a youth of twenty-one, the Archduke had already given promise of that devotion to science and practical life which afterward gained for him a most creditable reputation during his service in the Austrian navy, as well as of the tact and political liberality which made him conspicuously odious to the despotic faction in Austria, during his administration of Austrian Italy, as Governor-General of Venetia and Lombardy, in 1859. It is certain that the project of aiding to reorganize society in Mexico was seriously suggested to MAXIMILIAN before his marriage, in 1857, with the daughter of LEOPOLD, King of the Bel-

gians; and it is absurdly unlikely that by his father-in-law, the most liberal and sagacious of cotemporary monarchs, who defeated revolution in 1848 by simply offering to "pack his trunk and go" if the Belgians did not wish him to stay, MAXIMILIAN can have been encouraged to accept a throne not offered to him by the people themselves over whom he was to rule.

To go no further back in Mexican history than the origin of the Constitution under which, by virtue of Art. 79, Section II., Title III., JUAREZ claims to act as President of Mexico, the revolution of Ayutla, which gave the said Constitution to the country, is described in the Address of the "Constituent Congress to the Nation," as the result of a popular uprising "to throw off the yoke of the most ominous despotism." This "ominous despotism" being the fruit of a forty years' experiment at republicanism, who can be surprised that the most intelligent classes in Mexico should have wearied of the experiment? Things, not names, are the object of rational and practical men; and liberty with order, under an Emperor, is certainly preferable to an "ominous despotism," even though it be baptized a "republic."

This "revolution of Ayutla," which, in 1857, was to open for Mexico the way of return to "constitutional order," did nothing of the kind. "IGNACIO COMONFORT, Presidente Isunstituto de la Republica Mexicana," published the new Constitution with much solemnity from the National Palace at Mexico, February twelfth, 1857; but the ink with which it was printed was hardly dry before the civil commotions began again, which, had Mr. BUCHANAN's administration chosen to avail itself of the offers made by one of the thence resulting Mexican "governments," might have given us a new and splendid Mexican province, to exasperate our sectional passions in 1860. A stop being put to all this confusion and anarchy by the presence of the French army, the Mexican imperialists naturally seized upon that favorable moment to try their own path to this "constitutional order," which forty successive republican presidents had sought for in vain.

In his letter of July third, 1862, to Marshal FOREY, the Emperor NAPOLEON had said: "The object 'aimed' at is not to impose upon the Mexicans a form of government antipa-

thetic to them, but to aid them in their efforts to establish a government which shall have some prospect of stability, and of assuring to France redress for the wrongs of which she complains."

On the fall of JUAREZ, ALMONTE hastily set up a regency. This the French commander very properly declined to recognize, as the act of a single man without the popular authority, and an assembly of the Mexican notables, convening at Mexico, offered the crown of the empire to the Austrian Archduke MAXIMILIAN. This step was followed by the *ayuntamientos*, or local authorities, all over the country. The numbers represented in this action are much greater than is commonly supposed. In March, 1864, a synoptical table was published of the populations which had then "adhered" to the empire. They amounted to 5,498,587. According to the "Geographical and Statistical Society," the civilized population of all Mexico amounts to 8,629,982 souls. From which it appears that MAXIMILIAN has really been elected in Mexico by an immense majority of the people.

The burden of proof to show that he is not, certainly rests upon the representatives of a President who confessedly has *not* been elected at all, and who has been driven into the extremest corners of the Republic by a foreign force of about twenty-five thousand men!

CONCLUSION.

If now, in the first place, the "Monroe Doctrine," properly understood, does not require us either to interfere for the expulsion of MAXIMILIAN from Mexico, or to refuse to recognize his authority there; and if, in the second place, the nature of the French intervention in that country in nowise affects our national honor, what material interest have we in prolonging the present unsatisfactory state of the "Mexican Question," or in resolving it openly into a fierce and destructive war?

For Mexico, as we have seen by the confession of the Mexican Republicans themselves, the Republic means anarchy. Are we to aim at Mexican annexation through Mexican anarchy? What thinking man can desire to see the area of the Republic extended beyond its present limits, while the ques-

tions still to be solved in our domestic policy retain the gravity which now belongs to them?

Our commerce with Mexico, in spite of the impulse recently given to it by the liberal policy of MAXIMILIAN toward Americans in general, languishes under the pressure of doubt and concern as to the future. What that commerce might be, what it ought to be, and what, with but a few years of peace in Mexico and of peaceful relations with ourselves, it must become, few people adequately appreciate.

The following table, extracted from Mr. CARLOS BUTTERFIELD's interesting treatise on "The United States and Mexico," published in 1861, is impressively eloquent upon this head :

Country.	Population.	Imports.	Av'age per Capita.	Exports.	Av'age per Capita.
Mexico,.....	8,283,088	\$26,000,000	\$3.14	\$28,000,000	\$3.38
Cuba,	1,449,462	39,560,029	27.29	46,792,055	32.28
West-India Islands,.....	2,497,154	41,813,262	16.74	37,188,283	14.89
Central America,.....	2,195,450	5,648,017	2.57	6,566,246	2.99
South-America,	20,737,874	127,131,245	6.13	145,037,286	6.99
Total Spanish America,...	35,163,028	\$240,152,823	\$6.82	\$263,583,870	\$7.49
United States,.....	30,500,000	282,613,150	9.26	324,644,421	10.64
Canada,	2,571,437	49,288,245	19.16	31,813,020	12.37

From this table we may see how great a development the commerce of Mexico is capable of under favorable conditions.

At the present moment the total commerce of Spanish America, (including in that term, for convenience sake, the Empire of Brazil also,) with a population not greatly larger than our own, is probably equal in value to the commerce of the United States. Was the commerce of Mexico developed in a ratio only equal to the general average of the Spanish American States, it would much more than double the amount here given.

As we now see, it stands in the table above printed at a total—exports and imports taken together—of \$6.52 *per* head of the population; our own commerce standing at a total of \$19.90 *per* head of the population; and the average of Spanish America at \$14.31 *per* head of the population.

But Mexico, bounded on either shore by the ocean, with a singularly extended coast-line and many ports, combining within herself all the climates of the torrid and temperate

zones, enormously rich in mineral wealth, and possessing vast agricultural capabilities, ought to develop a commerce far above the general average of the Spanish American States.


What interest can we, then, as the nearest neighbors of Mexico, and the greatest commercial power of the New World, have in Mexico and her affairs at all comparable to that involved in such a pacification of the country as shall accelerate the natural development of its trade and commerce?

That it has already increased very greatly since the establishment of the Empire we know, on the authority of the *Journal des Debats*, one of the most respectable journals in Europe, and eminent not only for its opposition to the general policy of NAPOLEON III., but for its particular hostility to the Mexican Expedition.

We know, too, that a line of American steamers, running between New-York and Vera Cruz, and established no longer ago than last summer, is already regarded as one of the most prosperous of the pioneer enterprises, which, it is hoped, may restore to the United States, at least in a measure, our lost position as a ship-owning and steamer-building people.

Mr. BUTTERFIELD's tables were drawn up before the civil war. Since that time our own commerce has fallen off as rapidly as the commerce of France and England has increased, until from the second we have fallen to the third, and if we consider Germany as "one nation," to the fourth rank among commercial nations. When Mr. BUTTERFIELD wrote, we enjoyed *less than one sixth of the foreign trade of Mexico*, while Great Britain possessed more than *one half of that trade!* To-day, the disparity must unquestionably be much greater against ourselves, as will be evident when we consider that the commerce of Peru—a country in all respects naturally inferior to Mexico, and cursed, like Mexico, though less incessantly, with revolutionary "republicanism"—rose from \$16,880,377 in 1853 to \$62,500,000 in 1862; the United States gaining *nothing*, and Great Britain nearly *sixty per cent* of this increase.

How much longer must we persevere in a policy which thus sacrifices the permanent interests of mankind and the welfare of our own people to the dreams of visionaries, or the schemes of selfish and designing politicians?







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